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INTRODUCTION 
The Stuhmers1 appealed the trial court's ruling that denied awarding the Stuhmers' 
attorneys' fees on two grounds: (1) that the Stuhmers are entitled ^o attorneys' fees 
pursuant to the Declaration; and (2) that the Stuhmers are entitled to attorneys' fees 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-8262 because the Campbellsj would have been 
entitled to attorneys' fees had they prevailed due to their status as ^ Declarants because they 
were the Collisters' successor and/or assignee pursuant to Section's 2.3 and 9.1 of the 
Declaration. 
With respect to the Stuhmers being entitled to fees under the Declaration, the plain 
language of the Declaration: awards fees to the Declarants and their "successors" and 
"assigns." With the language being stated in the plural, fees should be awarded to the 
Stuhmers due to their status as "Declarants" and as "successors" jand "assigns." (R.18, 
Exhibit C, p. and Exhibit "G" to the Addendum attached to the S|tuhmers' initial appeal 
brief.) 
The Campbells' opposition is based on three grounds: firjst, the Campbells assert 
that the Stuhmers are not entitled to fees because they are allegedly not Declarants under 
the Declaration. In making this argument, the Campbells rt)y oi) the definition of 
"successor" and the argument that if the terms of the Declaration were construed as the 
1
 The Stuhmers' initial appeal brief listed the Stuhmers! as appellees because the 
Stuhmers were so referenced in prior documents. With the dismissal of the Campbells' 
appeal, the Stuhmers are now Appellants. 
2
 Formerly Section 78-27-56.5. 
Stuhmers contend, the terms "Declarants" and "Owner" would be redundant because they 
would essentially have the same meaning. The Campbells5 construction of the terms 
"successors" is not appropriate, and even if it were, the Campbells do not contest the 
Stuhmers' analysis with respect to the term "assigns," which the Declaration establishes is 
a group to whom fees are awarded. There is no dispute that the term "assigns" applies to 
the Stuhmers. Therefore, the attorneys' fee provision also applies to the Stuhmers who 
should be awarded their fees in defending this action. 
Second, the Campbells claim that the court ruled that neither party was entitled to 
fees due to the overly litigious nature of the parties. The court did make some comments 
regarding the parties5 excessive briefing of certain matters, but in conjunction with the 
court's ruling to deny fees, the court made no such finding that the Stuhmers were not 
entitled to fees on that basis. (R. 1329.) Furthermore, it was the Campbells who filed this 
action and amended claims while requesting that the Stuhmers multi-million dollar home 
be torn down due to the allegations that the roof was a few inches too high and the 
allegation that the home constituted two structures, in spite of the fact that the Stuhmers 
complied every step of the way with obtaining appropriate permits and approvals from the 
County and the Homeowners5 Association. (R. 1-15; 97-101; 245-257; 417-436.) 
Third, the Campbells assert that the Stuhmers are not the prevailing parties 
because the Campbells prevailed on their claim regarding the no trespassing sign. 
However, the no trespassing sign issue was moot prior to the trial because the Stuhmers 
took down the no trespassing signs pursuant to the Campbells5 request. (R. 1403, pp. 
2 
623-637; 1096-1097.) The court nevertheless considered the minor trespassing sign issue 
and made a ruling that although the Stuhmers could put up signs warning of danger, they 
could not put up a sign that says "no trespassing." (R. 1381.) In any event, the no 
trespassing sign claim was just a fraction of the case and the court expressly determined 
that the Stuhmers were the prevailing party. (R. 1382.) 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STUHMERS ARE THE PREVAILING PARTY. 
The Campbells assert that the Stuhmers were not necessarily the prevailing party 
because the Campbells succeeded on their claim regarding the impropriety of the no 
trespassing signs. The error in the Campbells' assertion is easily established by the 
court's own finding that the Stuhmers were the prevailing party. The judgment itself 
expressly states that "[t]he Stuhmers are also entitled to costs as the prevailing party. . . . " 
(R. 1382.) 
The Campbells also assert that the court made an express ruling that the Stuhmers 
were not entitled to attorneys' fees due to the litigious conduct of the parties. However, 
the court made no such ruling in connection with its decision to deny attorneys' fees. 
The basis for the court's determination that the Stuhmers were not entitled to attorneys' 
fees in the court's finding that the Stuhmers were not entitled to fees pursuant to the 
Declaration. (R. 1403, pp. 623-637; 1327-1329.) 
An examination of the claims that the parties prevailed upon also clearly 
establishes that the Stuhmers were the prevailing party. The Stuhmers prevailed on the 
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Campbells' two claims that the Stuhmers' home should be torn down. Those claims were 
that: (1) the Stuhmers' home allegedly was too high; and (2) the Stuhmers' home 
allegedly constituted two structures. These issues involved the bulk of the case and 
requested potential costs to the Stuhmers of millions of dollars. 
The no trespassing signs, on the other hand, involved a few signs that were 
approximately 2 feet by 3 feet, that were placed on the Stuhmers' property. The no 
trespassing signs were removed in a matter of minutes and were removed prior to trial. 
(R. 432; 1380; 1403, pp. 623-637; 1096-1097.) Pursuant to a request from Mrs. 
Campbell prior to the trial, the Stuhmers removed the no trespassing signs. (R. 1380; 
1401, p. 92; 1403, p. 616; 1096-1097.) The Stuhmers informed the court that the issue 
was moot. (R. 1096-1097.) Nevertheless, the court ruled on the issue. (R. 1381.) 
The prevailing party is defined as "[a] party in whose favor a judgment is 
rendered." A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Guy. 2002 UT App 73, ^  11, 47 
P.3d 92 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1145 (7th ed. 1999)). In determining the 
prevailing party, the Court may employ a "flexible and reasoned" approach that includes 
the net judgment rule. See J. Pochvnok Co.. Inc. v. Smedsrud. 2005 UT 39, ^ 10, 116 
P.3d 353, 356. The net judgment rule determines the prevailing party by looking at which 
party receives the bigger judgment. Id. However, "rigid application of the net judgment 
rule can result in unreasonable awards of attorney fees," which "would deprive trial 
courts of their power to apply their discretion and common sense to this issue." See A.K. 
& R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Guv. 2004 UT 47, ffif 25-26, 94 P.3d at 277. The 
4 
"flexible and reasoned55 approach avoids unreasonable awards in tfyose instances. 
Pochvnok, 2005 UT 39, ^ j 10, 116 P.3d at 356. It "requires not onljy consideration of the 
significance of the net judgment in the case, but also looking at th^ amounts actually 
sought and then balancing them proportionally with what was recovered,55 together with 
"additional common sense perspectives.55 Whipple, 2004 UT 47,1126, 94 P.3d at 277 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
This case was primarily about the Campbells5 two claims tlfiat the Stuhmers5 home 
should be torn down because a portion of the roof was allegedly too high and because the 
home allegedly constituted two structures. (R. 1381.) The court lfuled the Stuhmers were 
the prevailing party and the Campbells have not challenged the ruling establishing the 
Stuhmers as the prevailing party, but have instead mistakenly argilied that both parties 
prevailed and the Stuhmers are not the prevailing party. "[TJherei can be only one 
prevailing party.55 Mountain States Broad. Co. v. Neale, 783 P.24 551, 556 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). The prevailing party is the Stuhmers.3 
II. THE STUHMERS ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR FEE& PURSUANT TO 
THE DECLARATION. 
In section 2.3 of the Declaration, wThich governs the Homeowners5 Association, the 
term "Declarants" is defined and that term identifies, by name, 1^1 the parties who 
initially established the Homeowners' Association, and also identifies as "Declarants" all 
3
 The Campbells5 claims for injunctive relief related to the streambed were also 
unsuccessful and the Campbells received no damages from the jury related to the streambed. 
(R. 1381-1382.) 
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their "successors, mortgagees and assigns." (R. 18, Exhibit C, p. 4 and Exhibit "G" to the 
Stuhmers' Addendum.) Section 2.7 of the Declaration later defines the term "Owner" as 
the record owner or owners of any lot in the White Pine Ranches Subdivision. (Id.) 
The Campbells argue that the Stuhmers are not entitled to attorneys' fees under the 
Declaration because the Stuhmers do not come within the classification of "Declarants." 
The Campbells claim that the Stuhmers are within the classification of the term "Owner" 
and that Owners are not identified by the Declaration as being entitled to attorneys' fees in 
disputes relating to the Declaration. The Campbells farther claim that under the Stuhmers 
construction of the term "Declarants" the term "Declarants" and the term "Owners" would 
be synonymous and the Declaration would not have needed to make a distinction between 
the two. This argument is erroneous. 
The term "Declarants" identifies specific individuals and their "successors, 
mortgagees and assigns." (R. 18, Exhibit C, p. 4 and Exhibit "G" to the Stuhmers5 
Addendum.) Each of these specifically named individuals will always be a Declarant 
because they are expressly defined as such. If one of those Declarants sells their property 
they would no longer be an "Owner" but would still be a "Declarant" and if they were 
forced to litigate some item related to the Declaration after they sold their property they 
would still be considered a Declarant and would still be entitled to fees. They would 
however, no longer fall within the classification of an "Owner" because they would no 
longer own the property. Therefore, an Owner and a Declarant are not entirely identical 
as the Campbells assert. 
6 
The Campbells also take issue with the fact that the Declaration expressly 
mentions that Declarants are entitled to attorneys' fees, but makes no mention of an award 
of fees to Owners. Because Owners are "successors" and "assigns" of the Declarants and 
therefore are also Declarants as defined in section 2.3 of the Declaration, while the 
Owners own the property, the Owners are already entitled to fees and making the 
additional express reference again to Owners also being entitled to fees would be 
redundant. Indeed, section 1.1 of the Declaration expressly provides that "Declarant 
Developers and Declarants are the Owners. . . ." 
The Campbells have also attempted to distinguish the term "successors" in an 
effort to rebut the Stuhmers' claim that the Stuhmers are entitled tp fees as a successor 
and/or assign of a Declarant. At the trial level, the Campbells cited to several definitions 
of "successor" from Webster's Dictionary, and from various Utah statutes. (R. 1308-
1309.) The Campbells also cited to the "successor in interest" definition from the 
Ballentine's Law Dictionary. The Campbells cited such defmitio|ns tor the purpose of 
showing the use of the term "successor." (R. 1308-1309.) As thi Stuhmers pointed out 
in their reply memorandum to the trial court, it is inconceivable that the drafters of the 
Declaration intended to incorporate the definitions from two different dictionaries and 
several code provision when using the term "successor." (R. 1319.) The Stuhmers noted 
that the term "successor" has a common understanding as one who succeeds to the rights 
of another. (R. 1319.) Indeed, the general definition from the Webster Dictionary cited 
by the Campbells is that it is "a person or thing that succeeds, or follows, another. . . ." 
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(R. 1319.) The Campbells are now citing to yet another definition of the term "successor" 
from Black's Law Dictionary, which was not previously cited to the trial court. (R. 1307-
1309.) All of the Campbells' attempted word-smithing does not change the general 
meaning of the term "successor, which applies in this case. 
More importantly, although the Campbells have attempted to distinguish the term 
"successors," the Campbells did not address the fact that Section 2.3 of the Declaration 
provides that the "assigns" of the Declarants also have the rights of the Declarants 
identified in Section 2.3 of the Declaration. The definition of the word "assign" in 
Black's Law Dictionary, 8th Edition, is "See assignee." The definition of "assignee" is 
"one to whom property rights or powers are transferred by another." (R. 1320 and 
Exhibit "A" thereto.) The Campbells have not attempted to make a distinction regarding 
the word "assigns" which are also identified in section 2.3 as being entitled to attorneys' 
fees. There is no dispute that the Stuhmers fit within the classification of an assign. 
Additionally, using the plural of the terms "successors" and "assigns," establishes an 
intent for the provisions to apply to downline (multiple) successors and downline assigns. 
As a downline successor and assign, the Stuhmers are entitled to fees. 
III. THE STUHMERS ARE ENTITLED TO FEES PURSUANT TO UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78B-5-826. 
Due to the fact that the Campbells are "successors" and "assigns" of the Collisters, 
w7ho are expressly defined in the Declaration as "Declarants," the Campbells would have 
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been entitled to their attorneys5 fees had they prevailed, pursuant to Sections 2.3 and 9.1 
of the Declaration and Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826. Section 2.3 provides: 
2.3 Declarants: "Declarants" means Leon H. Saunders, Saunders 
Land Investment Corporation, a Utah Corporation, White Pine Enterprises, 
Robert Felton, FDIC in its Corporate Capacity as Purchaser of Certain 
Assets of Tracy Collins Bank & Trust, Stewart M. Collester & Johanna 
Collester as Trustees of the Collester Family Trust, White Pine Enterprises, 
James C. Bard, Donald Lewis Lappe & Alice Ann Lappe as Trustees of the 
Donald & Alice Lappe Family Trust, Howells Investment, Thomas H. Fey 
and Carolyn L. Fey, together with their successors, mortgagees and assigns 
and also, where appropriate includes those described herein as "Declarant 
Developers." 
(R. 18, Exhibit C, p. 4 and Exhibit "G" to the Stuhmers5 Addendum.) (Emphasis added.) 
Section 9.1 of the Declaration provides as follows: 
9.1 Enforcement and Remedies: The obligations, provisions, 
covenants, restrictions, liens and charges now or hereafter imposed by the 
provisions of this Declaration or any Amended Declaration shall be 
enforceable by Declarants, the Association, or any Owner of a Lot by any 
proceeding at law or in equity. If court proceedings are instituted in 
connection with the rights of enforcement and remedies provided in this 
Declaration, the Declarants or the Association shall be entitled to costs and 
expenses in connection therewith, including reasonable attorney's fees. 
(Id.) (Emphasis added.) 
Due to the fact that the Campbells would have been entitled to attorneys' fees 
pursuant to the Declaration if the Campbells had prevailed because the Stuhmers are the 
Collisters' "assigns" and "successors," the Stuhmers should be awarded fees pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826, which provides: 
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that prevails in a 
civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other 
writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the 
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promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one party to 
recover attorney's fees. 
This case was initiated by the Campbells due to their unhappiness with the 
positioning of the Stuhmers5 home. In spite of the fact that Summit County and the 
HOA's Architectural Committee had approved the Stuhmers' plans (R. 1377). the 
Campbells filed this action and the Stuhmers were required to either hire counsel and 
incur substantial attorneys' fees in defending the Campbells' claims or concede the claims 
and allow their house to be torn down. In such a scenario, where the court has a means 
for awarding the Stuhmers' fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826, "district courts 
should award fees liberally under Utah Code section [78B-5-826]", and the Stuhmers 
should be awarded their attorneys 'fees. Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 160 P.3d 1041, 1046 f^ 19 
(Utah 2007). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Stuhmers should be awarded their fees. 
DATED this _ ^ ^ d a y of August, 2009. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Kore^JErT^aOTiussen 
Attorneys for Appellants Christopher 
Stuhmer and Michelle Stuhmer 
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